Austin, Texas. behind the threads of bistro lights and began to disclose the campaign strategy of Beto O'Rourke in precise details. Malets, who was director of the Senate election campaign at O'Rourke is a high 30-year-old boy with thick eyeglasses and a hairstyle that can steadily drift toward the needle during the election season. He outlined the exact numbers of potential voters who, in the opinion of the campaign, should try to achieve how many of these voters had access to a mobile phone, and ̵
1; with some arithmetic – a critical amount that would have led to the final push of the campaign: the exact figure of volunteer telephone transfers, which he considered necessary to win the state.
This information about a granular campaign is usually considered a mystery. If Malitsa's conversation was in an encrypted PowerPoint presentation on a private server, it could be a profitable change for WikiLeaks home office. And if O'Rourke calls Donald Trump in 2020, this presentation can offer a cleaner encapsulation of how he can do it.
History goes on below
People who saw an online call for supporters and decided to appear on this day. It was September 15th, less than two months before the Senate elections, and nearly 2000 people registered at the stop on the campaign "Plan to win". . Over 800 eventually drove, through the rain to the east of East Austin did not know for existing public parking to visit.
"The plan of victory is actually quite commonplace," Malitz said from the outset, his voice echoing with a portable microphone. "Create a voter contact machine that will allow thousands of volunteers in each of Texas's 254 districts to conduct conversations with more voters across the state than any Texas history campaign."
For the Democrats, this story was gloomy. Malits reminded his audience that Jimmy Carter was the last presidential candidate in 1976, and that no Democrat had won an office in the state since 1994 – the longest loss of the party in any country in the country. No Democrat campaigning for the Senate did not even hit 10 percent of the victory over the current Republican for four decades. In order to build a different fate in the mid-term elections, the O'Rourke campaign should have caused 1 million Voices outside the current pool of active voters – in essence, to create an entirely new electorate within the state.
This goal was as follows. It's brave that Malets first had to convince his audience that it is even demographically possible. He explained that campaign analysts identified 5.5 million Texas voters who would likely support Rourke, but they probably did not vote in the 2018 election. to go after every last one: on the threshold, using text messages and through phone calls, Malits called what Beto called. All this suggests tens of millions of attempts to capture some of Texas's most politically elusive citizens.
The most radical was not the grandeur of rhetoric – the lines to attract everyone, especially those who vote, are typical of many democratic countries. speeches, but the Texas Democrat could have such a goal within its reach. In order to satisfy this, O & # 39; Rourke's campaign would have to throw fuel on its already explosive growth, quickly adding thousands of unpaid subscribers, text and blocking passersby to their ranks. The crowded lines before Malec showed that O'Rourke could cause this level of volunteers, but management was a separate challenge. Establishing an organization of this size usually takes months, even years, to hire and train locally, and then gradually flushes them to new ones. Rourke had a few weeks in the campaign.
"Well, so here we go!" – exclaimed Malits.
The mood returned from the TED to the resurrection meeting. "If you have space – a garage, your house, your business – what would you like to donate to pop-ups, please stand up right now," Malitz said. When people rose from their seats, Malits sparked applause, and then dozens of election commissioners directed them to issue documents that would block their adherence. Then, the same training for those volunteers who would run the pop-office or conduct trainings for telephone banks and block the walks. A few minutes after he first introduced his crowd to this enormous project Malets introduced hundreds of them to leadership roles.
At the same time, Malitz introduced to the Austin presentation "Plan to win" his deputy, Katelin Coglan, read the 354 participants from the same scenario in X'munhount. Malets has already given a field in Dallas and Denton, and was about to go on his Ford F-150, his rear seat littered with energy drinks by Rockstar and Almanac of American Politics to San Antonio to do it again. During the weekend and the previous events in the six largest cities of Texas, the participants undertook to fill almost 15,000 volunteer changes. There may be more in Texas, but when the two-year congressman El Paso was about to run for Senate a year ago, there was no reason to expect his campaign to reach such a huge size. (She ended up with staff similar to Donald Trump's entire national organization in 2016.) For almost a year, Malitz instilled in his team an irrepressible focus on growth at any price, with pleasure rejects precision and responsibility for the scale. . Along the way, they gladly broke a number of violations of how modern democratic campaigns should operate.
Rourke is currently on standby for president with a "loss of Senate candidate" as the most striking line on his resume. That's exactly what he has decided to launch this campaign last year, which distinguishes him from his potential democratic rivals. "Rourke rejected the hard-to-find relics of Barack Obama's campaigns: a fashion for data science, care for a professional organizing class, and one-on-one humanity. Instead, his campaign adhered to principles that are more reminiscent of the fact that Silicon Valley types are called "hypercamera" – a system that is flexible enough to expand at an exponential rate, in spite of the understanding that a rapid increase can justify and justify all other disadvantages.
Politically, it was a big bet on the strategy of mobilizing rare voters, rather than trying to win credible. National campaign strategists pay close attention to how O'Reorge made this: Few of the candidates took on the commitment, completely, if slightly thoughtlessly, to the belief that monomania is centered on a large-scale event – this is the most powerful tool which Democrats should use the Latent Numerical Majority in the United States.
Less than two months after the presentation of Malitz in Austin, when the figures came, it was clear that Beto O'Rourke managed to demonstrate more than any Texas democrat in the generation. It was also clear that this was not enough: on January 3, it was a Republican president, Ted Cruz, who took an oath to the Senate. Is the beta for the Senate a plan for the democrat, including O'Rourke himself, to act at the national level in 2020? Is this a conviction within the mobilization?
There are two ways to gain votes in the elections. The first is to convince those who are likely to vote and persuade them to choose you, either by selling your story or attacking your opponent. The other is mobilization, that is, finding people already standing on your side and pushing them to vote. Most candidates make each one by spending money on newsletters and advertising within the campaign of persuasion by mobilizing non-standard partisans with individualized voting reminders.
The arrival of Beto O'Reorge in Washington in 2012 is the easiest story of persuasion – a long-running contender for a seat in Congress who has beaten an acquaintance by persuading voters that he is best for another guy. Rourke was at that time a charismatic, but generally uncertain, 39-year-old. – The last one who launched the web design company and served in the city council of El Paso; He was encouraged to lead local local energy brokers who sought to expel a representative of Sylvester Reyes, a formidable device in a reliably democratic constituency in West Texas. The main challenge of Rourke was reinforced by a supercompute, partly funded by his test, which spent nearly a quarter of a million dollars on Reyes to enrich his seven-year long Congressional congress. The announcements helped raise questions about the overwhelming problem for voters choosing between them, so that later Reese's attempt to portray his opponent as a supporter of drug legalization was flat.
However, Rourke  himself, however, prefers to tell a completely different story about his journey to Washington. He likes to recall that he personally knocked on 16,000 doors in a race that solved approximately 3,000 votes, never mentioning that he pulled two pairs of shoes in the process. This activity has been transformed into a cadre of young volunteers whose free work brought balance to the race, in which Rickard's campaign, which had one staff member, raised herself to less than half the money Reese had.
experience, the victorious candidate and his advisers have created their own myth about the creation in which success has reached interpersonal contact, not the convincing power of the media. "Part of our DNA: if you're not at the door, you will not win the race," Susie Byrd, a former colleague of the city council, told Rick, who was active in his campaigns, Texas observer.
After two terms in Congress, O'Reorge decided to use this story and aim even higher by taking on a regular figure with apparent weaknesses: Senator Ted Cruz, a brutal conservative who was personally unpopular and damaged by a dirty national primary fight with Donald Trump. After the 2016 election, Rourke asked the Chief of Staff of Congress, David Weisson, to develop a strategy for expelling Cruz, and the aesthetics of knocking out doors became central to the very concept of the campaign.
Executive staff who worked as a volunteer in the 2012 campaign. He has no experience in politics that is not useful to his friend Beto, and remains unusual among decision makers, for being willing to express uncertainty, ignorance, even doubt. In his work he planned to organize a nationwide choice for O'Reorge, studying two organizations of a national campaign that was blessed and damned with great enthusiasm among volunteers and donors, and tried to capture this enthusiasm in different ways.
Obama's presidential campaigns were the first to be seen as a benchmark for high-tech, local elections. Their field organizations relied on a trapezium-like structure in which thousands of employees managed one another. Below was the organizer of the field, designed to supervise the office – usually it was a rented shop designed to serve as a friendly communal center for volunteers. The main unit for their work was a team of neighbors, which included members who lived next to each other. Each team was run by an organizer, whose success was measured by the number of volunteers who were recruited and trained by teams under her team. The task was to make the official, headquarters campaign so everywhere – in 2012 in Ohio, 131 of them remain, that volunteers will be involved in frequent changes in local activities. Campaign officials called it "a model of Starbucks."
Obama organizations have had enough money and time not to make large compromises between their depth in the communities and the breadth of their reach, but, like most of the campaign participants, Wysong knew he would be compelled to choose. "The thing in Texas is just an infinite number of goals that you never literally get." Would I like to impress them all? So. I would. At the same time, I do not know that I could have enough money to get there, "he said. "It will take a huge deal, which we could never afford in a typical way."
He has found much more to take on the commitment of the 2010 presidential primary campaign of Bernie Sanders, which had neither time nor predictability. such a rigid national structure. The most important early states of Iowa and New Hampshire monopolized official resources, while other states, whose primaries and sessions Sanders were not convinced that he would survive in order to force himself to compete, were forced to cope with the small. In addition to those who voted ahead of time, the campaign found hot volunteers, but could not provide employees with management or offices for their placement. A bold and potentially risky decision came from Zack Aksley and Becky Bond, two long-time left-wing activists who came to the Sanders campaign with well-developed skepticism to the traditional tactics of their organization. The only way they could quickly bring mass motion to scale they believed was to skip a serious case of a professional organization and adopt a decentralized approach. "In the current social context, people should not be politically awake – they are ready to work to make changes," they wrote in Rules for revolutionaries: how large a organization can change everything, memoir-cum manifesto about Sanders's experience and his lessons. "The revolution will be led by volunteer leaders who take on the work on the campaign plan, the plan is so great that it can only be achieved when everyone who wants change (most people) works together"